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I. INTRODUCTION
By all accounts, the Voting Rights Act of 1965' was an extreme measure, a
"strong medicine" 2 designed to "eliminate, in an automatic way, massive
discrimination." 3 Arriving on the heels of Bloody Sunday and the tragedy at Selma,
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington.
** Russell M. and Elizabeth M. Bennett Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000)).
2. Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 110 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of Rep. Chelf).
3. Id. at 402 (statement of Rep. Celler).
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and authored by high-ranking officials in the Johnson administration, its breadth
and scope were seen as necessary tools in the national fight against racial
discrimination in voting. As President Johnson remarked during his national
address before ajoint session of Congress on March 15, 1965, this was a fight "for
the dignity of man and the destiny of democracy."
4
The proposed legislation was hailed as a national response to a national
problem, but under the relevant provisions of the Act, one could be forgiven for
thinking otherwise. Under Section 4(b)-its trigger provision-the Act affected
only those jurisdictions (1) that had implemented a literacy test and (2) in which the
voter registration rate on November 1, 1964 or voter turnout rates for the 1964
Presidential election did not reach fifty percent. Under this formula, the Act
initially covered Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina,
Virginia, and twenty-six counties in North Carolina.6 This was not a coincidence.
In the words of the Attorney General, the Act would "get rid of the problem in
those areas which have been discriminating and discriminating and discriminating
and have been doing it for a long period of time."7 Chairman Celler similarly
remarked during the House hearings that "the purpose of this Bill ... is primarily
to get at those States where there exists massive discrimination and to provide
automatic-I use the word 'automatic' advisedly-automatic relief."
8
The Act was not universally admired, particularly by those who bore the force
of its provisions. During the 1969 Senate hearings regarding the extension of the
Act, for example, Senator Ervin complained that the "North Carolina Legislature
should [not] be required to come to Washington to the Attorney General's office,
and bow and scrape and make obeisance before him and say, 'Please allow this act
of our legislature to go into effect."' 9 Previously, during the 1969 House hearings,
A. F. Summer, Mississippi's Attorney General, similarly argued, "It is section 5 of
this act that we cannot live with, nor do we believe the other five States affected can
live with it."'" To his mind, this section of the Act was akin to a "sentence," which
forced covered jurisdictions to "go down to [their] lowest common denominator
4. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to Congress: The American Promise, PUB.
PAPERS 281 (Mar. 15, 1965).
5. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(b); 42 U.S.C 1973b(b) (2000).
6. The formula would also pick up the state of Alaska and three other counties: Apache County
in Arizona, Aroostook County in Maine, and Elmore County in Idaho. See Voting Rights Act: Hearings
on S. 1564 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 33 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate
Hearings] (testimony of Att'y Gen. Katzenbach).
7. Id. at 33.
8. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 685.
9. Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 818, S. 2456, S. 2507, and Title
IV of S. 2029 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong. 201 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Senate Hearings] (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr.).
10. Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearings on H.R. 4249, H.R. 5538, and Similar Proposals
Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 130 (1969) [hereinafter 1969
House Hearings] (statement of A.F. Summer, Attorney Gen. of Miss.).
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before you can rejoin the other States. This is not right, no matter the cause, it is
not right."1
From this perspective, the preclearance requirement, whereby the covered
jurisdictions must submit all election-related changes to the Attorney General for
approval, or seek a declaratory judgment from District Court for the District of
Columbia that such changes will not discriminate against prospective voters on the
basis of race, "is not right, no matter the cause ' 12-no matter Selma, the Civil
Rights Movement, the turbulent sixties, or anything else. Senator Ervin and
Attorney General Summer were not alone in their views of the Act but did not have
many friends where it mattered. In the inevitable challenge to the Act's
constitutionality, they could only rely on Justice Black-a fellow Southerner-who
complained in his dissent in South Carolina v. Katzenbach3 that the Act "creates
the impression" that the covered jurisdictions "are little more than conquered
province[s]."' 4  The Court admitted in South Carolina that the coverage and
preclearance provisions "may have been an uncommon exercise of congressional
power,"'" yet the Court did not suffer much difficulty in upholding the Act.' 6 This
was in the midst of the Civil Rights Movement, after all, when the Court went out
of its way to allow Congress the power to carry out its legislative agenda. 7
Conceding that its approach to the problem of racial discrimination in voting
was radical in nature, Congress initially enacted the coverage provision as a five-
year measure. 8 Thus, absent an extension of the Act in 1970, the coverage of the
Act would sunset under an implicit acknowledgment that the need for such strong
medicine had ceased to exist. Yet in 1970, Congress extended this provision for an
extra five years,'9 and in 1975 it extended it again, for seven years.20 In 1982,
Congress considered extending the preclearance provision permanently, but
11. Id. at 129.
12. Id.
13. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
14. Id. at 360 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
15. Id. at 334 (majority opinion).
16. Id. at 337; Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966).
17. According to John Lindsay, a congressional representative from New York, "the country is
in a mood to do what is right and I think the Congress is in a mood to do what is right." 1965 House
Hearings, supra note 1, at 372. See Archibald Cox, Forward: Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91,91 (1966) ("A newer theme is the strong declaration
of congressional power under Section 5 of the [Flourteenth [A]mendment. If the Congress follows the
lead that the Court has provided, the last Term's opinions interpreting Section 5 will prove as important
in bespeaking national legislative authority to promote human fights as the Labor Board decisions of
1937 were in providing national authority to regulate the economy." (Footnote omitted)); see also
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 265 (2000) ("The Court was
extending an offer to Congress to become a full partner in the Court's great tasks, just as Congress had
become with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.").
18. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 79 Stat. 437, 438-39.
19. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 3, 84 Stat. 314, 315.
20. Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 101, 89 Stat. 400, 400.
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compromised to 25 years. 2 1 This brings us to the year 2007, when Congress will
again have to decide whether to extend the life of the preclearance provision.
The debate over the Act's extension promises to encompass familiar themes,
such as the scope of congressional powers under the Reconstruction Amendments,
the breadth of the federalism revolution of recent vintage, and the continued need
to enact race-conscious legislation to combat instances of perceived racial
discrimination. This Article sets these important issues aside and begins with a
prior inquiry. It examines the Department of Justice's (DOJ) practices in carrying
out its duties under its Section 5 authority. Before debating the merits of the
preclearance requirement and its role in American political life during the last forty-
two years, we must first understand the DOJ's actual preclearance practices. We
begin this project by focusing on the state of South Carolina.
Our findings are mixed. From the time of enactment until 1995, the DOJ
interposed a steady number of objections to proposed changes from South Carolina.
Yet after 1995, the number of objections decreased sharply. This drastic change
raises myriad implications. For one, it appears to support the argument from the
Act's critics that the preclearance requirement has outlived its usefulness. The
sharp decline also supports the view that the Supreme Court has gutted the Act to
the point the DOJ no longer has a useful role to play under Section 5.
Despite these implications, we are not ready to advocate for the sunset of the
preclearance provision. This is because we found that even though the absolute
number of objections declined, the number of objections based on retrogression
grounds, that is, on the state's inability to convince the DOJ that the proposed
change did not make voters of color worse off than they were before, remained
steady. Moreover, the decline in objections might be explainable on at least two
alternative grounds.
We offer our findings in four Parts. Part I contextualizes the argument by
providing a snapshot of the state of voting rights in South Carolina pre-1965. This
Part demonstrates the magnitude of the problem and the concomitant need for a
strong voting rights bill. Part II examines post-1965 South Carolina and the state
of voting rights once the Act took effect. Parts III and IV present the results of our
examination of the objection letters from the DOJ to governmental institutions in
South Carolina. In conclusion, we look to present day South Carolina and offer our
view on the reauthorization question looming in the horizon.
II. VOTING RIGHTS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA: A BRIEF
HISTORY
In his opinion for the Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach-the first direct
challenge to the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act-Chief Justice Warren
opined, "[Jun most of the States covered by the Act, including South Carolina,
various tests and devices have been instituted with the purpose of disenfranchising
Negroes, have been framed in such a way as to facilitate this aim, and have been
21. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(a), 96 Stat. 131, 131.
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administered in a discriminatory fashion for many years. 2 In specific reference
to South Carolina, Chief Justice Warren quoted some choice passages by United
States Senator Ben Tillman,2 a the unquestioned leader of the post-Reconstruction
movement to disenfranchise black citizens.24 During the 1895 South Carolina
constitutional convention, for example, Tillman defined the goals of the new state
literacy test as follows: "[T]he only thing we can do as patriots and as statesmen is
to take from [the 'ignorant blacks'] every ballot that we can under the laws of our
national government. ' 25 On the floor of the United States Senate, Tillman offered
similar sentiments: "[W]e took the government away. We stuffed ballot boxes. We
shot them. We are not ashamed of it."
2 6
Senator Tillman was neither alone in his views nor an accident of late
nineteenth century racial politics in South Carolina. In 1940, a local Democratic
party official explained his position on the question of race and politics to a
journalist: "If a coon wants to vote in the primary, we make him recite the
Constitution backward, as well as forward, make him close his eyes and dot his t's
and cross his i's. We have to comply with the law, you see. 27 And soon after the
United States Supreme Court invalidated the white primary in 1944,2' Governor
Johnston convened a special legislative session, where he told the legislators that
"[a]fter these statutes are repealed... we will have done everything within our
power to guarantee white supremacy in our primaries. 29
These sentiments help contextualize a much larger and troubling story of overt
black disenfranchisement in South Carolina. The devices were many and included
the usual suspects, such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and understanding clauses, as
well as lengthy residency requirements, short registration times and hours, and the
outright denial of the franchise for committing particular crimes."a When these
measures failed to keep blacks from casting ballots, election officials stood as the
last line of defense, ready to take any needed measure to keep black voters from
casting valid ballots. As precinct manager Wade H. Ratcliffe explained when he
was charged in 1964 with telling a black voter to put his ballot in the wrong box,
"I knew this was wrong but we have always done these things."
31
22. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 333-34 (1966).
23. Id. at 310n.9.
24. See RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN
VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM 86 (1975).
25. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310 n.9 (alteration in original) (quoting JOURNAL
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 464 (1895).
26. 33 CONG. REC. 2245 (1900).
27. Orville Vernon Burton, "The Black Squint of the Law": Racism in South Carolina, in TIE
MEANING OF SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GEORGE C. ROGERS, JR. 161, 171
(David R. Chesnutt & Clyde N. Wilson eds., 1991).
28. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944).
29. V. 0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 627 (1949).
30. See Orville Vernon Burton et al., South Carolina, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE
IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, at 191, 231 tbl.7.9 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard
Grofman eds., 1994).
31. Camden Chronicle, Feb. 19, 1965, at 1.
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This evidence, standing alone, offers a serious indictment on the purported
legitimacy of South Carolina's pre-1965 political system. In looking at the
registration and turnout numbers, it becomes immediately clear that the system
worked as intended. For example, as seen below in Table 1, only 15 percent of the
black voting-age population was registered to vote in 1958.32 This number stood
in sharp contrast to the registration rate for the white voting-age population, which
was approximately 31 percent.33 By 1962, 22.9 percent of the black voting-age
population was registered to vote, and two years later, this figure had increased to
37.3 percent of voting-age blacks' (compared to 75.7 percent for voting-age
whites).35 In total, registered blacks accounted for only 17 percent of all registered
voters in South Carolina in 1964.36 These figures led the authors of an important
account on the Voting Rights Act's impact in South Carolina to conclude that "[o]n
the eve of passage of the Voting Rights Act, South Carolina remained thoroughly
in the grip of white supremacy.
37
TABLE 1.
ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF REGISTERED VOTING-AGE
POPULATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA
3 8
1956 1958 1962 1965
White t 31 83 75.7
Black 27 15 22.9 37.3
t No figures were available for this date for white registrants.
32. See infra Table 1.
33. DONALD L. FOWLER, PRESIDENTIAL VOTING IN SOUTH CAROLINA 1948-1964, at 44 (1966).
34. See infra Table 1.
35. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 13 tbl. (1968).
36. Orville Vernon Burton et al., supra note 30, at 199.
37. Id.
38. See DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, at II tbl. 1-2, 19 tbl. 1-3 (1978), for the black registration figures. Garrow provided
a caveat concerning the fluctuations in the totals-particularly in reference to South Carolina's figures
from 1956 to 1958-which he stated "are the result not of drastic changes in actual registration levels
but of overly optimistic estimations made in one year and more sober estimates made several years
later." Id. at II tbl. 1-2. In this vein, we must note the statistics found in U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
REPORT OFTHE UNITED STATES COMMISSIONON CIVIL RIGHTS 1963, at 35 (1963), reflect a much lower
figure-8.3 percent for black registrants of voting age in 1956 and 7.4 percent in 1962. For the white
registration figures, see U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 252-53 tbl. 11
(1968), and U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS 1963, at 35 (1963).
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During the House debates in the spring of 1965, state officials disputed time
and again the charge that South Carolina discriminated on racial grounds. On the
second day of the hearings, for example, United States Representative Robert
Ashmore queried Attorney General Katzenbach on this point: "You don't have one
single case on the record in recent years to show that they have discriminated
against any man because of race or color. You don't know of any, do you, Mr.
Attorney General? '39 The Attorney General acknowledged that the DOJ had not
brought any suits in federal court against South Carolina or its officials, and the
DOJ had also addressed some of its concerns to local officials, who in turn had
taken "remedial steps," but this was not to say, he made clear, that "we have never
had any evidence at all of racial discrimination."'
In subsequent days, Daniel McLeod, South Carolina's Attorney General, was
far more direct in his assessment that the state was not guilty of racial
discrimination in voting. For example, to the charge that disparities in registration
rates along racial lines were due to discrimination against prospective black
registrants, he responded, "I account for it in one word: indifference, voting
indifference."'" He continued, "Now, you cannot, to my way of thinking, draw an
assumption from the disparity between the Negro registration ratio as opposed to
the white registration ratio, in the face of lack of interest in voting not only among
the negro population but among the white population."42
Moments later, Representative McCulloch asked McLeod whether he believed
"that there might be discrimination by threats or intimidation, or by subtle pressures
that are very effective in this regard in other States and in other human activities
[]y,43 Being "perfectly candid," McLeod explained that he "kn[e]w of none. I can
state in all sincerity that if they do occur, they may occur, I think they occur to a
minimal extent. I have had no complaints."'
In the end, these and similar assertions by officials from other jurisdictions did
not persuade the 89th Congress. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 passed both houses
of Congress by wide margins: the House passed the bill by a vote of 328 to 74; in
the Senate, it passed by a margin of 79 to 18.
I1. A WELCOMED CHANGE: THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
As expected, the Voting Rights Act had a remarkable effect. The issue of
minority disenfranchisement was framed as a problem of voting registration, as
demonstrated by the prominence of registration figures, which served as both
evidentiary tools and as part of the statute's coverage formula. During the House
hearings, Attorney General Katzenbach remarked, "Our concern today is to enlarge
39. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 114.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 603.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 605.
44. Id.
45. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966).
2006]
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
representative government. It is to solicit the consent of all the
governed. It is to increase the number of citizens who can vote." 46 In an oft-quoted
passage, Burke Marshall similarly contended that "[t]he problem that the bill was
aimed at was the problem of registration, Congressman. If there is a problem of
another sort, I would like to see it corrected, but that is not what we were trying to
deal with in the bill. 47
And in this regard, the bill performed admirably. As seen in Table 2, the
estimated percentage of the voting-age black population registered in South
Carolina rose to 51.4 percent in 1966 and held steady through the end of the
decade.48 By 1974, the number had risen to 60.8 percent, which compared
favorably to the white registration rate of 61.3 percent.49
TABLE 2.
ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF VOTING-AGE POPULATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA5°
1966 1967 1970-1971, 1974
White 81.7 81.7 51.2 61.3
Black 51.4 51.2 48 60.8
Without question, the Act brought dramatic and rapid improvement to the
registration numbers in South Carolina.
Tellingly, the Act also brought important changes in the composition of state
and local boards. As seen in Table 3, the sum total of blacks elected to the state
legislature in 1964 was zero.5 The number remained unchanged in 1966, yet by
1991, seventeen black representatives had reached the state house and six had
reached the state senate. These numbers rose steadily through the 1990s so that by
2001, South Carolina had one black representative in Congress, seven black state
senators, and twenty-four black state representatives 2 Similarly impressive gains
can be seen when looking at county, municipal, and school board posts.53
46. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 17. He repeats this sentiment a few moments later.
See id. at 19.
47. Id. at 74.
48. See infra Table 2.
49. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER 375-76
tbl.1-C (1975).
50. GARROW, supra note 38, at 200 tbl.6-2; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION 252-53 tbl. 11 (1968); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 49.
51. Orville Vernon Burton et al., supra note 30, at 232 tbl.7.10.
52. See DAVID A. BOSITIS, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 2001, at 14
(2003).
53. Id.
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TABLE 3.
RACIAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA LEGISLATURE 54
White 46 46 45 40 39 38State Senate
Black 0 0 1 6 7 8
White 124 120 109 107 100 99State House Black 0 4 15 17 24 25
These numbers compare favorably with the racial composition of the state,
even if a significant gap remains. As Table 4 shows, the percentage of blacks in
South Carolina over the last forty years has hovered around the 30 percent mark.
TABLE 4.
POPULATION BY RACE IN SOUTH CAROLINA5 5
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
White Population 65.1% 69.3% 68.8% 69% 67.2%
Black Population 34.8% 30.5% 30.4% 29.8% 29.5%
To be sure, blacks in the state are not represented in the state legislature to the
level their numbers might indicate. But this conclusion betrays a far more important
story; to wit, these numbers portend an important trend in South Carolina politics.
One can reasonably attribute most of this success to the Voting Rights Act. The
next Part offers data to show how the DOJ used Section 5 to improve black political
participation in South Carolina.
54. Charles S. Bullock, 1II & Ronald Keith Gaddie, An Assessment of Voting Rights Progress in
South Carolina 35 tbl.5 (Oct. 1, 2005), available at http://www.aei.org/research/nri/subjectAreas/
pagelD. 1140, projectlD.22/default.asp (click "VRA South Carolina Executive Summary and Study").
55. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, various editions.
2006]
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IV. MEASURING IMPACT: A VIEW OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT FROM THE
OBJECTION LETTERS, 1965-2005
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires those jurisdictions included within
its coverage formula to preclear with the United States Attorney General any
change in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting. 5 6  The
Attorney General has the discretion to deny preclearance if the proposed change has
the "purpose... [or] effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color. '57  Alternatively, a covered jurisdiction may seek a declaratory
judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that their
proposed changes do not have that prohibited intent or effect.
5
These words leave much to the imagination and have proven difficult to put
into practice. For example, what exactly is a standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting? And when does a change have the purpose or effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color? These are by no means
rhetorical questions.59 From the perspective of the Supreme Court, these questions
have posed difficult interpretive challenges, which the Court has resolved in
accordance with its particular view of its own role. Soon after the statute's
enactment, the Court interpreted these words broadly; in so doing, it played a direct
role in expanding the Voting Rights Act in American political life. As the Court's
composition changed, so did the Court's broad and expansive readings.
60
From the time the Court faced a direct challenge to the constitutionality of the
Act in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, it became amply clear that the words of the
statute would find a receptive audience with a Court majority. In South Carolina,
and while acknowledging that the Act established "stringent new remedies," and
some of its provisions were "inventive" and "uncommon," the Court concluded that
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Bossier Parish I1, 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000) ("[W]e hold that § 5 does not prohibit
preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose."); Beer
v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) ("[A] legislative reapportionment that enhances the position
of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise can hardly have the
'effect' of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of § 5.");
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 531, 535 (1973) (holding Georgia's 1972 reapportionment plan,
which included "the extensive reorganization of voting districts and the creation of multimember
districts in place of single-member districts," fell within the scope of Section 5); Perkins v. Matthews,
400 U.S. 379, 387 (1971) ("[Wle think it clear that the location of polling places constitutes a 'standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting."'); Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 293
(1969) ("We conclude that in an action brought under § 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it is
appropriate for a court to consider whether a literacy or educational requirement has the 'effect of
denying ... the right to vote on account of race or color' because the State or subdivision which seeks
to impose the requirement has maintained separate and inferior schools for its Negro residents who are
now of voting age."); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 550 (1969) (considering whether
new laws and regulations passed in Mississippi and Virginia fell within the prohibition of Section 5).
60. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Taking Statutory Language to its Constitutional Limits: The Case
of the Voting Rights Act 15-39 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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the means used by Congress were a legitimate, permissible response to the problem
at hand.61 And in Katzenbach v. Morgan,62 the Court similarly concluded that the
abrogation of a requirement of English literacy for persons who had completed a
sixth-grade education in Puerto Rico would pass constitutional muster.63 The Court
reached this conclusion in the face of Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of
Elections,64 decided a scant seven years earlier, where the Court had upheld the
constitutionality of literacy tests.65
Three years later, in Allen v. State Board of Elections66 and Gaston County v.
United States,67 the Court continued its expansive readings of the statute, this time
in furtherance of its understanding of the substantive provisions of the Act.
Subsequent cases followed this script,68 and may be said to culminate with United
States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama,69 where the Court
concluded, in the face of contravening legislative history, that a political
subdivision that did not conduct voter registration was covered under Section 4 of
the Act.
In due time, however, the Court ceased to read the provisions of the Act in such
forgiving fashion.7" It can be said that the first case to do so was Beer v. United
States.7' In Beer, the Court interpreted the effects prong of Section 5 of the statute
to encompass only retrogressive effects, that is, changes that would leave blacks in
a worse position than before the change. 2 Two further cases, decided within the last
ten years, further narrowed the scope of the statute and the role of the DOJ under
Section 5. In the first installment of Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board,7 3 the
Court held that the DOJ cannot object to a proposed change on the ground that the
change violates Section 2, the vote dilution provision.74 And three years later, the
Court concluded that the DOJ must preclear a discriminatory though non-
retrogressive proposed change.75
Given the case law, we would expect the objection letters to show objections
based both on retrogression and discrimination grounds, up to the year 2000. After
2000, and if the lawyers at the DOJ are reading the case law, we would expect to
only see objections on retrogression grounds. Curiously, however, the evidence on
this point is both scattered and anecdotal in nature. In other words, few accounts
61. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 327, 334-37 (1966).
62. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
63. Id. at 643-47.
64. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
65. Id. at 51-53.
66. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
67. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
68. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
69. 435 U.S. 110 (1978).
70. Id. at 135.
71. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
72. Id. at 141.
73. (Bossier Parish 1) 520 U.S. 471 (1997).
74. Id. at 478-81.
75. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish I1), 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000).
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have attempted to look at the letters to tell a story about the relationship between
the DOJ and the Court. This is puzzling, as the DOJ has played the leading role in
carrying out the Act's mandates through its Section 5 power.
This Part seeks to fill this important void in the literature by examining the
objection letters issued by the DOJ to political entities in South Carolina seeking
to preclear changes covered under the statute. In particular, we wish to understand
what the DOJ considered a Section 5 violation and how well it was able to detect
when such violations arose. This information is important because it provides
greater clarity to the debate of whether Congress should reauthorized the
preclearance provision. To debate whether Congress should reauthorize Section 5
or allow it to sunset, it is important to get a clearer picture of what will be lost if
this important statute expires.
An understanding of the legal constraints on the DOJ is helpful in
understanding how Section 5 is administered and the scope of its coverage. Yet one
must also examine the DOJ's actual practices. Thus, this Part pursues two related
goals. First, it presents an overview of the form and substance of the objection
letters from the DOJ to South Carolina officials. Second, it offers a synopsis of the
mechanics of preclearance in South Carolina as seen from the objection letters.
More particularly, we examine the number of objections offered by the DOJ, the
types of submissions to which it objected most often, and the factors it considered.
This Part also discusses a very important finding: the DOJ objected most often to
proposed changes by county and city entities.
A. The Letters: Form, Substance, and Cover
From our survey of objection letters from the DOJ to South Carolina, we
discern three important themes. First, the DOJ is remarkably respectful toward
state and local officials. In South Carolina, for example, the DOJ issued its first
objection letter on March 6, 1972, it was addressed to Daniel McLeod, South
Carolina's Attorney General.76 The letter referenced the state's submission of its
senate redistricting plan, for which the DOJ denied preclearance. 7  After explaining
his reasoning and offering a spate of lower court cases supporting the plan's denial,
Assistant Attorney General Norman stated:
We have reached this conclusion reluctantly because we fully
understand the complexities facing any state in designing a
reapportionment plan to satisfy the needs of the state and its
citizens, and, simultaneously, to comply with the mandates of the
Federal Constitution and laws. We are persuaded, however, that
the Voting Rights Act compels this result.
78
76. Letter from David L. Norman, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Daniel E.
McLeod, S.C. Attorney Gen. (Mar. 6, 1972).
77. Id. at 3.
78. Id.
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This posture is remarkable for many reasons. The DOJ need not explain itself to
state and local officials, and surely may take the view that whatever covered
jurisdictions have coming to them is a direct result of the jurisdiction's own past
practices. Yet, the DOJ showed respect that might border on deferential. To be
sure, one can argue that the question of impact looms in the background, and the
covered jurisdictions may simply choose to make things harder for the DOJ, either
by refusing to submit changes for preclearance or evading the statute in other ways.
The DOJ seemed to recognize this possibility and responded by treating the
jurisdiction with a modicum of respect that, one might argue, is undeserved in light
of the reasons the jurisdiction fell under the Act's coverage in the first place.
A second feature of the letters, which is a direct reflection of the statutory
scheme, is their burden-shifting component. In an early letter, Assistant Attorney
General Norman explained, "[W]e are unable to conclude as we must under Section
5, that [the change] ... does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color."79 The letters
continually repeat this refrain in basically the same form. A jurisdiction submits
a proposed change with information about its enactment, and the DOJ then
determines within sixty days whether the change violates the statute. If the DOJ
needs more information, it asks for more, and the sixty-day window begins to close
only after the DOJ has an opportunity to determine whether the change does not
have the purpose, and will not have the effect, of denying or abridging the right to
vote on racial grounds.
Many letters demonstrate the importance of the statute's burden-shifting
component. Consider, for example, the August 23, 1982 letter from Assistant
Attorney General Bradford Reynolds to the Assistant Attorney General of South
Carolina."° The letter addressed, inter alia, abolishing the Hampton County Board
of Education.8 According to Reynolds:
Our analysis shows that the county board has been particularly
responsive to the interests and needs of the black community in
Hampton County and consistently has appointed bi-racial
representation on the local boards of trustees for both School
District 1 and School District 2. We remain unsatisfied on the
information submitted by the State that elimination of the county
board-in a county with a 52-percent black population and a
system which allows the use of a plurality and single-shot method
of election-does not deprive black voters of an opportunity to
79. Letter from David L. Norman, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Hardwick Stuart,
Jr., S.C. Assistant Attorney Gen. (Nov. 13, 1972).
80. Letter from William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Havird
Jones, Jr., S.C. Assistant Attorney Gen. (Aug. 23, 1982).
81. Id. at 1.
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elect representatives of their choice who can help assure that
interests of blacks will be protected on a county-wide basis.
8 2
Essentially, the county board of education was good for the black community, and
the state had not shown that eliminating it would not harm black interests. Without
any such showing, the statute demands the DOJ deny preclearance. 3
Consider also Assistant Attorney General John Dunne' s letter to attorney James
Gonzales, who was acting on behalf of the City of North Charleston.' The letter
addressed the city's submission of its districting plan for preclearance. 5 Dunne
noted that the city had used an at-large election method for the offices of mayor and
city council and that voting in the city was racially polarized.86 While blacks
constituted a third of the city's population, under these conditions, only one black
candidate had won a council seat. 7 A local referendum election forced the city to
adopt a districting method for electing its council members, and it was this new
plan the city submitted to the DOJ for approval.88
Under the new plan, blacks constituted a majority in two of the ten districts,
and Dunne therefore conceded the plan satisfied Beer' s89 retrogression prong.90 Yet
the plan must also satisfy the statute's purpose prong, and here the city's position
was not as strong. Dunne explained:
Our analysis indicates that districting options were readily
available to the city which would allow for one or more additional
black majority districts and thus would more fairly reflect black
voting strength. Two aspects of the city's plan are implicated in
this regard. First, the plan appears to minimize black electoral
opportunity by fragmenting black neighborhoods, located in the
southern area of the city, into white majority districts where
blacks will not have an opportunity to elect council members of
their choice. Second, the city chose to combine the military base
populations exclusively with white majority areas, although the
base populations also adjoin the city's black neighborhoods and
could as easily be combined with those neighborhoods to result
in districts in which black voters are in the majority since, as we
82. Id. at 1-2.
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
84. Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to James E. Gonzales,
Esquire, Gonzales & Gonzales (May 3, 1990).
85. Id. at 1.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
90. Letter from John Dunne to James E. Gonzales, supra note 84, at 1-2.
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understand it, this military population is largely inactive in the
local electoral process.91
Dunne conceded that valid, nonracial reasons may justify the city's choices
"unnecessarily limiting black voters to a realistic opportunity to elect
representatives of their choice in only two districts," but "[o]ur review has not
indicated any."92 One such reason may be protecting incumbents, yet "it appears
that the devices employed here to accomplish that goal were inextricably linked to
minimizing black voting strength. 93 And while recognizing the time pressures on
the city to adopt a new plan, Dunne noted "the city sought to meet the deadline by
adopting a plan through a closed process which did not permit fair and open debate
about the available districting alternatives, and foreclosed serious consideration of
the views of minority residents."'94
On these facts, Dunne explained, "I cannot conclude, as I must under the
Voting Rights Act, that the city has carried its burden in this instance." That is, the
city did not carry its burden of showing the proposed plan was not enacted with
discriminatory racial purpose. This result is remarkable, especially because this
burden-shifting device places the onus on the state to prove a negative, while
vesting great discretion in the United States Attorney General to preclear or object
to plans under review. Of note, this discretion was one of the great worries offered
by the plan's critics during the early congressional hearings.95 United States
Attorney General Mitchell himself leveled this criticism during the 1969 hearings,
contending "the processes provided under which the Attorney General must make
a decision are not adequate. They result in arbitrary decisions without sufficient
information. 96 Our review of the letters, however, makes clear the Attorney
General has not abused this seemingly boundless grant of authority.
Finally, the letters also reveal the DOJ is parsing through the doctrine to
enforce the statute as the Supreme Court interprets it. The DOJ is thus behaving as
a court-interpreting opinions and applying them to the facts at hand. In light of
91. Id. at 2.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 257 (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary) (complaining that
Section 5 "subordinates the decisions of the elected representatives of the people in the States to the
unreviewable whims of an executive official of the Federal Government").
96. Id. at 204 (statement of John Newton Mitchell, Att'y Gen. of the United States). Mitchell
explained, "[W]ith respect to the filing of the legislation in the DOJ, that having lived with it I did not
think it was the proper place for a determination of whether statutes are or are not going to be used in
a discriminatory fashion." Id. at 232. He also complained the best he could do under Section 5 was to
"try and guess as to the effect of the legislation." Id. at 233. Senator Hruska
thought [Section 5] was wrong because it put into the hands of an appointed
political office of another branch of the Government the right to veto, in effect,
the legislative act of a State legislature. It was wrong because it is difficult to
judge a law, a draft of a law, in a vacuum.
Id. at 239 (statement of Sen. Hruska).
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the preclearance power's volatile nature and the many issues such an inquiry raises,
the letters offer an expected subtext; when enforcing the statute as interpreted by
the Court, the DOJ often string cites cases that support its conclusion or demand the
result it reached. In effect, the DOJ is saying, "It is not us, it's them. If you
disagree with our position, do not complain to us, complain to the Court."
B. A Look at the Data
1. Frequency of Objections
The Voting Rights Act came into law in August 1965, yet judging the
preclearance requirement's effectiveness from that date would be unfair because the
preclearance provision lay dormant for many years. This was a common refrain
during the 1969 hearings from those supporting the Act's extension. As
Representative McCulloch explained, "Section 5 was intended to prevent the use
of most of these devices. But apparently the States rarely obeyed the mandate of
that section, and the Federal Government was too timid in its enforcement.
' 97
South Carolina offers a perfect example of this complaint. The DOJ offered its first
objection under the preclearance provision on March 6, 1972.98 As Table 5 shows,
this was the first of forty-eight objections the DOJ offered during the 1970s.
TABLE 5.
NUMBER OF OBJECTIONS BY DECADE: SOUTH CAROLINA
Decade Number of Objections Number of Submissions
(Letters)t
1970-1979 48 (52) 30
1980-1989 36 (46) 2,665
1990-1999 32 (34) 10,194
2000-2004 9 (9)
TOTAL 125 (141)
t The numbers in parentheses represent the total number of objection letters, including objection
letters to resubmissions and requests for new information.
97. 1969 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 4 (statement of Rep. McCulloch); see also id. at 61
(statement of Howard A. Glickstein, General Counsel and Acting Staff Director, U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights) (labeling the DOJ's role during the first four years of the Act as "deficient").
98. Letter from David L. Norman to Daniel E. McLeod, supra note 76.
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Table 5 illustrates the conventional story of the letters and the role of the DOJ in
interposing objections to proposed changes. In the early years of the Act, when the
problems to which the Act is directed were at their highest, one would expect the
DOJ to interpose the highest number of objections, and the data bears out this
assertion. The objections then began a steady decline through the decades, only to
sharply decline in the last five years.
These findings are in line with our general expectations of the Act. Like any
other medicine, the Act was intended as a temporary measure with the view that it
would ultimately alter the social and political norms across the region. Once the
Act altered these norms, the number of objections would diminish, and the Act's
special provisions would ultimately sunset. Hence, one conclusion may be that the
medicine has taken effect and that the Act is therefore no longer needed. As
subcommittee chairman Don Edwards remarked during the 1975 House hearings,
"The act that was the result of this frustration was a radical bill. It was bent on
results without delay. It was also designed to be temporary. After a few years of
harsh measures, the practices of a lifetime would be reversed and special Federal
protection would no longer be necessary. ' '99
2. Types of Objected Submissions
Examining the types of submissions eliciting objection letters from the DOJ
presents a similar picture. As Table 6 indicates, we classified the objectionable
submissions into four major types: objections to voting systems, including
objections to at-large election systems, numbered posts, and residency
requirements; objections to form of government; objections to procedures; and
objections to redistricting; and objections to the drawing of boundaries.
99. Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148, H.R. 3427, and H.R.
3501 Before Subomm. on Civil and Const. Rights, 94th Cong. 887 (1975) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
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TABLE 6.
TYPES OF OBJECTIONABLE SUBMISSIONS BY DECADE: SOUTH CAROLINA
Type of Decade
Objectionable
Submission
1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-05 TOTAL
Voting Systems 50 15 3 2 70
Form of 15 13 12 4 44
Government
Procedures 13 22 7 0 42
Redistricting 4 7 17 4 32
Boundaries 2 5 4 2 13
TOTAL 84 62 43 12 201
There are two findings worth underscoring. First, most objections were for
submissions seeking changes in electoral structures, such as voting systems and
redistricting. Second, there is a partial repetition of the downward trend discussed
in Section A. With regard to voting systems, the DOJ began by offering fifty
objections for the first full decade of the Act's existence, fifteen objections for the
following decade, three objections during the 1990s, and only two objections
between 2000 and 2005. However, the reasons for these findings might not be as
before. Instead, perhaps jurisdictions learned to live with the preclearance
requirement, or simply ceased making changes to which they knew the DOJ would
object. Alternatively, as detailed by the steady objections to redistricting plans, the
DOJ might have shifted its gaze to other sources of concern.
3. Factors Considered
A third important finding relates to the factors considered by the DOJ when
interposing a preclearance objection. As Table 7 indicates, our review of the data
as a whole makes clear that the DOJ considers multiple factors before deciding
whether a standard or practice has the effect or purpose of abridging the right to
vote on the basis of race."°
100. This was particularly true in the 1970s and 1980s.
[Vol. 57: 827
PRECLEARANCE, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE DOJ
TABLE 7.
TOP TEN REASONS STATED BY DOJ FOR
DENYING PRECLEARANCE: SOUTH CAROLINA, 1970-2005
Reason for Objection Number of Objections
Racial Bloc Voting 65
Minority Population 64
At-Large Districts 41
Majority Vote Requirement 36
Limits Opportunity to Election Candidate 34
of Choice
Rejected Available Alternatives 33
Absence of Non-Racial Explanations 29
Opposition by Communities of Color 29
Past Failure to Elect Candidates of Color 28
Use of Staggered Terms 22
Some of these factors, such as retrogression and racial discrimination/vote dilution,
should be expected. In particular, the DOJ paid close attention to the potential
impact of electoral structures on voters of color.
In this vein, consider the following letter, from Assistant Attorney General
Drew Days to the county attorney in Bamberg County, South Carolina, in reference
to a change in the method of choosing members of the county school board. After
refraining from objecting to a change in the date of the referendum and the
changing of these posts from appointive to elective, the Assistant Attorney General
stated:
With respect to the at-large feature of the electoral system we
have carefully considered the information you provided as well as
election returns for at-large elections in which black persons have
competed. We are concerned under Section 5 with whether this
at-large feature dilutes the voting strength of any group of persons
on the basis of race or color.
We note that the submitted plan calls for the election of seven
School Board members, one from each of the seven councilmanic
districts. Blacks comprise 42 percent of the registered voters, at
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least half of the voting age population, and have the potential to
elect three candidates of their choice under the present
councilmanic districting system. The injection of an at-large
feature, against the background of racial bloc voting that appears
to exist in the county, significantly reduces the opportunity of
minority voters to select the candidates of their choice.10 1
This letter displays a nuance and tenor regularly seen in objection letters: an at-
large election, coupled with the racial background of the submitting jurisdiction,
leads to a concern that the proposed change does not meet the preclearance
standard.
This is a common refrain throughout the letters. The DOJ paid close attention
to electoral structures and their potential impact on voters of color. In particular,
the DOJ strongly discouraged state and local officials from adopting particular
electoral structures due to their negative impact on communities of color.
Pointing out that structural objections played a leading role in the preclearance
process only tells part of the story. We make two further points. First, it is clear
that structural objections did not play the only role. Our review of the data supports
this assertion; the DOJ used an eclectic, gestalt approach when reviewing proposed
changes and considered the combined impact of electoral structures on
communities of color. In this regard, consider the DOJ's first objection letter, dated
March 6, 1972, in which the DOJ objected to a submission for preclearance from
South Carolina. ° 2 The letter referenced a proposed change to South Carolina's
redistricting plans for its state senate districts. 13 Assistant Attorney General David
Norman stated:
We have given careful consideration to the submitted
districting plans (Plan A and Plan B) and the supporting
information, as well as to information received from other
sources. Insofar as time limitations have allowed, we have
studied both plans in detail. As a result, however, we are unable
to conclude, as we must under the Voting Rights Act, that either
proposed Plan A or Plan B will not have the effect of abridging
the right of black citizens of South Carolina to vote on account of
race or color.
A careful analysis and review of the demographic facts
involved and recent court decisions identify several significant
areas of concern. Twelve of the 23 proposed districts under Plan
A and 14 of the 20 districts in Plan B are multi-member. We note
that in these districts candidates must run for numbered posts. It
101. Letter from Drew S. Days, 111, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to D. A. Early,
County Attorney, Bamberg County, S.C. (Aug. 31, 1977).
102. Letter from David L. Norman to Daniel E. McLeod, supra note 76.
103. Id. at 1.
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is our understanding also that South Carolina law requires a
majority of votes to win primary elections. A substantial number
of multi-member districts in each plan have significant
concentrations of black population.
Our analysis of recent federal court decisions dealing with
issues of this nature, and to which we feel obligated to give great
weight, leaves us unable to conclude, with respect to these plans,
that the combination of multi-member districts, numbered posts,
and a majority (run-off) requirement would not occasion an
abridgement of minority voting rights in South Carolina. °4
The mix of multi-member districts, numbered posts, and a majority vote
requirement led the Assistant Attorney General to conclude the DOJ could not
preclear the changes.' °5 This is a common approach throughout the letters. In his
letter of August 17, 1973, to the mayor of Darlington, Assistant Attorney General
J. Stanley Pottinger was far more explicit: "Based on all the available facts and
circumstances, the Attorney General is unable to conclude as we must under the
Voting Rights Act that the changes involving the implementation of residency
requirements and a majority requirement will not have a discriminatory racial effect
on voting. ' ' 1°6
Second, this is a story of clear decline. As noted in Figure 1, objections to
structural changes dropped sharply from the first to the second decade of the DOJ's
enforcement of the Act.
FIGURE 1.
STRUCTURAL AND PROCESS-BASED PRECLEARANCE DENIALS:
SOUTH CAROLINA, 1970-2005
too
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104. Id. at 1-2.
105. Id. at 2-3.
106. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Frank A.
Wells, Mayor of Darlington, S.C. (Aug. 17, 1973).
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Figure 1 tracks the frequency of objections interposed on structural grounds
between 1970 and 2000. These objections include at-large systems, majority vote
requirements, staggered terms, and residency requirements. From a high of thirty-
four in the 1970s, these objections came down to single digits in the 2000s. This
data can be interpreted in a number of ways. One way may be to suggest the
Department succeeded in weeding discrimination from the political process. This
view is in accordance with the Act's original goal as a temporary measure. Just as
likely, however, is that the data suggests that covered jurisdictions simply stopped
submitting changes that included these structural devices. In this vein, this decline
may be attributed to the fact that the DOJ was successful in eliminating structural
devices as elements of discrimination because they are easier for the DOJ to police
and monitor than process-based issues.
4. Local Governments as Culprits
The final finding may be the most important. Commentators often focus on
state legislatures as the primary violators of Section 5. On this view, they argue
Section 5 may no longer be needed in a politically competitive South, where parties
must fight for votes irrespective of race or color. 7 Our study of South Carolina
introduces a wrinkle in this argument. Table 8 identifies each level of government
responsible for implementing a proposed change and the number of objections
against that level.
107. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own
Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1731 (2004) (examining "the changed political environment that
has eroded the preconditions for the success of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act ... [and concluding]
that section 5 has served its purposes and may now be impeding the type of political developments that
could have been only a distant aspiration when the VRA was passed in 1965").
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TABLE 8.
OBJECTIONS BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT: SOUTH CAROLINA, 1975-2005
Level of Decade
Government
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s TOTAL
State 19 15 7 4 45
County 13 11 8 1 33
City 19 18 17 4 58
School District 1 2 2 50 5
TOTAL 52 46 34 9 141
As Table 8 shows, the DOJ interposed the most objections against proposed
changes submitted at the county and city level. The table underscores the
importance of paying attention to how voters of color interact with local
government officials. Knowing how many elected officials of color are in the
legislature may not suffice. One must also pay attention to the composition of
school boards, city offices, and county offices, all of which are loci of significant
political power in the South.
V. A CLOSER LOOK: THE LETTERS, THE DOJ, AND THE COURT
Part IV offered our analysis of the preclearance requirement's impact as the
DOJ enforced it. Concededly, that analysis was general in scope and broad in
perspective. This Part shifts the analysis to the objection letters. We believe this
inquiry is important and fruitful for two reasons. First, while mindful of the
preclearance requirement's politically volatile nature, we examine how the DOJ
executed its duties under the statute. This is an important story, especially because
the preclearance power was dormant for the first five years of the Act. The DOJ
issued the first objection letter in South Carolina on March 6, 1972.108 Second, we
explore how the DOJ enforced the preclearance requirement as the Supreme Court
interpreted it through the years. Put another way, scholars often assume the Court
crafts the doctrine and the DOJ slavishly enforces it. We find that assumption is
both incomplete and somewhat inaccurate. While it is true that case law guides the
DOJ-and the DOJ follows case law to a great extent-it is also true that case law
is far from the only factor the DOJ considers in deciding whether to deny
108. See Letter from David L. Norman to Daniel E. McLeod, supra note 76.
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preclearance. In light of the DOJ's broad discretion, however, this finding should
not be at all surprising.
A. The Court and the DOJ: A Purported Colloquy
Section 5 offers an incomparable canvas for mapping the Supreme Court's
doctrine and the doctrine's application as enforced by the DOJ. This last Section
examines that interaction, which we understand as a colloquy between the Court
and the DOJ. We make two particular observations. First, the DOJ looks carefully
to the doctrine and applies it to the facts at hand. Second, the DOJ does not feel
bound by doctrinal proscriptions, and other factors play a role as well.
1. On Justice, the Court, and the Doctrine
The story of Section 5's enforcement as seen through the objection letters plays
out in a predictable pattern. In the early years, the DOJ looked across the case law
and pieced together cases to determine whether a proposed change violated Section
5 standards. The Supreme Court had yet to speak about the standard's parameters,
so the DOJ looked mostly to lower court cases from across the circuits, as well as
Supreme Court vote dilution cases.
Whitcomb v. Chavis,'°9 White v. Regester," ° and Zimmer v. McKeithen"'
figured prominently among these cases. The DOJ was thus looking to equal
protection case law for guidance-and for good measure. After all, Congress
intended to shift the inquiry into voting changes in covered jurisdictions away from
the time consuming litigation process to the sixty-day DOJ inquiry. Thus, the DOJ
was justified in looking to equal protection doctrine, the very source a court would
look to in reviewing the proposed plan. And so, as the DOJ stated after objecting
to the establishment of a residency requirement, "In considering the system for
conducting future elections in your city, you may wish to obtain legal advice on the
possible constitutional infirmities involved in at-large elections under comparable
situations...".2 The letter cited Regester and the Fifth Circuit cases of Zimmer v.
McKeithen and Turner v. McKeithen1.3 for support." 4
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Georgia v. United States, which upheld
DOJ regulations placing the burden of proof on the submitting jurisdictions." 5
Georgia v. United States soon became boilerplate, and the most consistently cited
109. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
110. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
111. 467 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1972).
112. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Tuck
McConnell, City Manager, Walterboro, S.C. (May 24, 1974).
113. 490 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1973).
114. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger to Tuck McConnell, supra note 112, at 2.
115. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 541 (1973).
[Vol. 57: 827
PRECLEARANCE, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE DOJ
case in the letters. The D.C. Circuit's 1974 opinion in Beer v. United States"' soon
became prominent in the DOJ's objection letters as well.
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided the Beer appeal and established a standard
of retrogression for the effects prong of the Section 5 inquiry." 7 After that, one
would expect Beer to dominate the discussion across the objection letters, but it
does not. Beer was first cited in an objection letter dated March 22, 1977, and in
a companion cite with Regester."8 The next citation to Beer appeared five letters
later, on February 6, 1978. 19 The case was cited once again on September 27, 1979
but did not play an important role in the DOJ's determination. 12 On January 12,
1983, Beer finally appeared as the important case it should be, apparently
controlling the outcome of the DOJ's determination. 2 ' After this letter, Beer
quickly joined the list of oft-cited cases, joining Georgia v. United States and City
of Richmond v. United States. 22 Incidentally, by this time, Whitcomb and Regester
had disappeared entirely from the letters.
To be clear, our point is not that the DOJ misapplies the law or chooses cases
in accordance to its political predilections and in the pursuit of its preferred political
outcomes-far from it. The DOJ's attempts to faithfully follow the Court's
precedent should impress anyone reading these letters. Rather, our point is how
much discretion exists within the doctrine for the DOJ to play an important role in
enforcing it. Even when the doctrine appears very clear, as with Beer, reality never
quite catches up to this perception. Thus, understanding the many criticisms of the
DOJ's role in this area is easy. The DOJ's discretion can appear to be close to
boundless.
Consider in this regard a final letter, from Assistant Attorney General R.
Alexander Acosta to H. Bruce Buckheister, Mayor of the Town of North. 23 The
letter addressed two proposed annexations to the town. 124 In objecting to these
annexations, the letter explained:
The test for determining whether or not a jurisdiction made
racially selective annexations is whether the annexation policies
and standards applied to white areas are different than those
applied to minority areas. If the standards are not the same or
116. 374 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1974).
117. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
118. Letter from Drew S. Days, m, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to J. D. Cato,
Mayor of Pageland, S.C. (Mar. 22, 1977).
119. Letter from Drew S. Days, IiI, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Div., to Treva G.
Ashworth, S.C. Assistant Attorney Gen. (Feb. 6, 1978).
120. Letter from Drew S. Days, III, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Howard P.
King, County Counsel, Sumter, S.C. (Sept. 27, 1979).
121. Letter from William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to J.
Lewis Cromer, Richland County Attorney (Jan. 12, 1983).
122. 22 U.S. 358 (1975).
123. Letter from R. Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to H. Bruce
Buckheister, Mayor of North, S.C. (Sept. 16, 2003).
124. Id.
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have been applied inconsistently, there is a strong likelihood that
the decision not to annex the minority area had a discriminatory
purpose.
25
The letter cited City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, Perkins v. Matthews, and,
as a "see also" cite, Bossier Parish H for support.1
2 6
This citation to Bossier Parish II is noteworthy, as the case appeared to
foreclose all inquiries into discriminatory purpose, and instead focused the
preclearance process on retrogression and whether the proposed change had a
negative impact on people of color. 2 7 Yet the DOJ reached back to a 1987 case and
a 1971 case and explicitly engaged in a purpose inquiry. One can view this as a
misreading of the case law, or perhaps one can instead see this letter as part of the
great deal of discretion accorded to the DOJ even under seemingly settled doctrine.
2. On the Limits of Doctrine: Looking Around
One clear finding from our review of the letters is how broadly the DOJ
understood its role under Section 5. We do not think we can overstate this point:
the DOJ often acted as an advocate for communities of color, and other times as a
mediator between these communities and state and local governments. This finding
turns democratic theory on its head. Here is the cold, distant federal government
interceding on behalf of citizens of color and speaking for .them to state and local
officials-yet the evidence is unmistakable. Consider an objection letter from
Assistant Attorney General Stanley Pottinger to an attorney for the town of
McClellanville, South Carolina, in connection with the town's desire to annex two
surrounding areas.'28 The objection letter noted the existence of "an area of
concentrated black population immediately contiguous to the town" that was not
included in the preclearance submission. 129 The Assistant Attorney General stated:
The information available to us is... conflicting with regard to
the desire for annexation among the residents of the area of black
population adjacent to McClellanville. Information which we
have received from town officials would indicate that the majority
of the adjacent black residents prefer to remain outside the town's
boundaries. But our direct discussions with those residents, and
with private citizens who claim familiarity with the desires of
those residents, indicate a strong desire for annexation.
Moreover, residents of this adjacent black area, who appear to be
125. Id.
126. Letter from R. Alexander Acosta to H. Bruce Buckheister, supra note 123.
127. See Bossier Parish I1, 528 U.S. at 341.
128. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Philip A.
Middleton, Attorney, Town of McClellanville, S.C. (May 6, 1974).
129. Id. at 1.
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representative of the majority of the residents involved, have
informed us that town officials have made clear to them that any
formal request for annexation of the area would be rejected,
primarily because the addition of the residents of the area would
serve to dramatically alter the racial composition of the town's
present predominantly white population. 130
Pottinger explained his office was aware the mayor of McClellanville would be
meeting with black leaders "to more clearly determine the desires of the area's
residents for annexation, and to inform them that the necessary steps under state law
should be taken by those residents if a desire for annexation is evidenced.' '3 1 In
this vein, he further noted that the DOJ was open to reconsider its objection after
this meeting took place but only if the town provided the minutes of the meeting,
"the actions of the residents taken in pursuit of annexation, and the actions and
determination of the town officials in response to the efforts of the black
residents." '132 In other words, the DOJ was telling the town to listen to the black
residents and meet their concerns, and only then might the DOJ preclear the change.
The role of communities of color in the preclearance process can be
characterized in two ways. First, the DOJ often relied on local leaders and
"representative" groups to gain a clearer sense of local political realities. Consider
the following objection letter, offered in response to a proposed change of a county
superintendent's office from election to appointment.'33 According to Assistant
Attorney General Pottinger:
Comments received from black residents of Clarendon County
indicate a perception that the abolition of the elective office in
conjunction with a potential black majority electorate shows a
discriminatory purpose or effect. Moreover, representations have
been made to this office that some black citizens of Clarendon
County do not agree that this elective office should be abolished
and that black candidates would offer for this position had it not
been abolished. We have carefully reviewed the justification
submitted to satisfy the state's burden of proof that the submitted
change does not have the purpose or effect of denying or
abridging voting rights on the basis of race. Under all
circumstances of this case we are not so persuaded and must
therefore interpose an objection ...
130. Id. at 2.
131. Id. at 3-4.
132. Id. at4.
133. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Hardwick
Smart, Jr., S.C. Assistant Attorney Gen. (Nov. 13, 1973).
134. Id. at 1-2.
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This letter is remarkable in its admissions. Note that comments from black
residents indicate not a fact-but only a perception-that the change, coupled with
a potential black electorate, showed the requisite discriminatory purpose or effect.
Additionally, local black residents informed the DOJ that black candidates would
in fact run for this office if still an elective post. Clearly the DOJ would not have
this information on its own, and the state and local officials would be unlikely to
furnish it. More importantly, the DOJ took the word of these black representatives
unquestioningly.
Second, the objection letters as a whole leave us with a very strong impression
that when black leaders object to a proposed change, the DOJ listens. Consider a
follow-up objection letter from Assistant Attorney General Pottinger to the South
Carolina Attorney General. In the first letter, the DOJ provisionally objected to a
proposed plan including staggered terms and residency requirements but did not
object to an at-large electoral feature.'35 Seventeen days later, the DOJ issued the
following objection letter:
On September 17, 1974, a delegation of black citizens of
Bamberg County visited with representatives of this Division and
presented petitions signed by more than 600 persons in opposition
to the utilization of the at-large system of election in Bamberg
County. Basically, the delegation raised issues as to the validity
of our previous presumptions that the at-large voting system, in
the context of plurality win and the ability to single-shot vote,
provides blacks a realistic opportunity to elect candidates of their
choice in Bamberg County. In this connection, they cite the 1972
municipal elections in Denmark where it is claimed that in face of
such a "single-shot" effort by blacks, white candidates withdrew
to an extent that the field of candidates was reduced to a point
which made any single-shot effort of blacks (a minority of
registered voters) ineffective. In addition, we have been advised
that voter registration efforts among blacks in the county have
been frustrated and that those elected to office have not sought to
protect black interest nor to satisfy black needs.
These claims raise serious questions as to which, I am sure
you will understand, we are unable to resolve within the 60 days
allowed the Attorney General to render his final determination
under Section 5 .... Therefore .... I must interpose an objection
to the at-large feature of the new system of government in
addition to those objections previously registered in my letter of
September 3, 1974.136
135. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Daniel R.
McLeod, S.C. Attorney Gen. (Sept. 3, 1974).
136. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Daniel R.
McLeod, S.C. Attorney Gen. (Sept. 20, 1974).
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This letter is noteworthy for many reasons, not least of which is the degree to which
the DOJ chose to object based on the advice of black delegates from the affected
community. As before, the representatives offered a version of the facts of which
the DOJ was unaware, and the DOJ responded to these new developments by
registering an objection.
We found this conduct by the DOJ to be quite prevalent. From our review of
the data, and as Figure 2 shows, the DOJ often issued objection letters while
explicitly stating the opinion of communities of color as a basis for denying
preclearance.
FIGURE 2.
OPPOSITION BY COMMUNITIES OF COLOR AND DOJ OBJECTIONS:
SOUTH CAROLINA, 1972-2004
1970 1980 1990 2600
Decade
For example, of forty-three objections interposed by the DOJ throughout the 1970s,
six explicitly denied preclearance because communities of color opposed the
proposed changes. The 1990s show a similar trend: eight of thirty-one denials
explicitly stated the opposition of communities of color. As Figure 2 shows, the
DOJ has relied on communities of color from South Carolina throughout the four
decades of Section 5 administration.
B. Furthering Political Participation
Our reading of the objection letters leads us to a second conclusion. When
analyzing the proposed changes under the Section 5 prism, the letters portray a DOJ
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concerned with racial discrimination, to be sure, but also with protecting broad
political participation by citizens of color. Put another way, the DOJ emphasized
removing barriers to full political participation by voters of color. For example,
consider the following letter in response to a proposed change that would require
county employees to resign their employment if they wished to run for public
office. According to the letter:
With regard to the resignation requirement, we note from
1980 Census data that blacks constitute approximately 39 percent
of the population of Richland County. According to information
provided by the personnel department of Richland County, blacks
constitute approximately 31 percent of the employees of Richland
County. In addition, the 1980 Census data and data from the
county concerning salaries of county employees lend support to
the concerns expressed by some that the resignation requirement
will operate as an economic disincentive which will impact more
heavily on the black potential candidates than on the white
potential candidates. This burden will in turn significantly affect
black voters in Richland County because it limits the pool of
potential candidates likely to be the choice of the black
constituency.
An additional concern raised by information received from
black and white county residents is that the 1986 change requiring
resignation was designed to inhibit potential black candidates. A
change cannot be precleared if it is tainted with an invidious racial
purpose.
... Under the circumstances involved here, I am unable to
conclude, as I must under the Voting Rights Act, that these
provisions are free of the proscribed purpose and effect.137
As before, this letter indicates the DOJ's cognizance of the many nuances affecting
the statutory calculus. But more importantly, the letter offers a broad understanding
of the DOJ's role in pursuing the statute's goals.
Consider a second letter, this time in reference to a submission for a change in
the qualifications for probate judges. The Assistant Attorney General noted:
At the outset we note that currently the sole qualification for
a person to be a candidate for the position of probate judge in
South Carolina is that a person be a registered voter. Presently,
26 percent of the registered voters in the state are black, according
to our information. The state now proposes to change those
qualifications so that a person must be 21 years of age and either
137. Letter from William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to C.
Dennis Aughtry, County Attorney, Richland County, S.C. (Sept. 23, 1988) (citations omitted).
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possess a degree from a four-year college or at least four years'
experience working in a probate judge's office. According to the
1980 census, there are 232,629 persons who have completed four
or more years of college, and of this number only 28,771 (12%)
are black. Thus, the four-year college degree requirement would
reduce the percentage of black citizens who meet the qualification
to run for the office of probate judge by 14 percent. Requiring
that persons who wish to run for the office of probate judge
demonstrate that they have completed four years of college,
therefore, would appear to have a disparate impact on black
citizens of the state.
While we recognize the state's interest in establishing
reasonable qualifications for those who are to hold office,
especially those of the nature here, it cannot do so in a manner
which weighs disparately upon its black constituents, absent a
convincing reason.... We are not yet persuaded that the state's
legitimate interest cannot be met through other means which do
not produce the "undesirable racial effect[]" of the qualifications
proposed.138
These letters epitomize the broad and forgiving role the DOJ adopted in
administering Section 5. To be sure, many objections were concerned with the
standard anti- discrimination account and whether the proposed change had either
the intent or effect of disadvantaging voters of color. Yet more importantly, a
noticeable number of objections paint the DOJ as concerned that the proposed
changes were not sufficiently furthering consequential political autonomy by voters
of color.
The DOJ was able to interpret the statute in this way-and pursue such vague
and amorphous concerns-due to the nature of Section 5's burden-shifting
device.' 39 Under the statute, the burden rests with the submitting jurisdictions to
prove their proposed changes do not have a discriminatory purpose or effect."4 A
cursory examination of the letters underscores the importance of this feature, as the
DOJ often explains that under the facts as then present, it is "unable" to preclear the
proposed plan. This importance is also evident by the many times the DOJ relied
on Georgia v. United States, in which the Supreme Court upheld DOJ regulations
that placed the burden of proof on the submitting authority.' 4 ' This is the single
most cited case in letters between 1970 and 1990. Hence, if the DOJ thought a
given proposal did not further the political interests of voters of color, it did not
138. Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to C. Havird Jones,
Jr., Assistant S.C. Attorney Gen. (Oct. 15, 1990) (brackets in original).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
140. Id.
141. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 541 (1973).
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need to prove so. Rather, the DOJ only needed to object to the plan and force the
submitting jurisdiction to prove otherwise.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article began with a modest goal: to show the DOJ's accomplishments in
enforcing Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and how it had fulfilled these
important responsibilities. Our examination led us to conclude the DOJ was far
more aggressive in the early life of the Act, while its enthusiasm for enforcement
has diminished steadily through the decades. This finding may be interpreted a
number of ways. One suggestion is the Act has done as intended, so the need for
Section 5 power no longer exists. We are not enamored by this characterization,
especially because the Court has interpreted the statute narrowly in recent years.
That narrow interpretation, particularly evident in the Bossier Parish cases,
probably had a direct influence in the steep decline in objection letters.
Based on this data, where should we go from here? More specifically, what
should Congress do when it revisits the reauthorization question in the next year?
One possibility is for Congress to confront squarely the Court's role in this
important field. In past hearings, Congress has generally paid cursory attention to
judicial opinions interpreting the Act, often adopting them sub silentio. In light of
the sharp decline in objections, it stands to reason that Congress must make a clear
choice if it chooses to extend the life of the Act. If our interpretation of the data is
correct, after all, an extension of the statute that refuses to wrestle with the
important issues raised by the Bossier Parish cases might hardly matter.
Another answer is that Congress must explore whether the Act has in fact
served its purpose and whether reauthorization is necessary. Again, we offer this
suggestion in light of our findings, particularly the sharp decline in objection letters.
Looking ahead to the inevitable constitutional questions that reauthorization of the
Act will raise, this need for new evidence will play a leading role in determining the
constitutionality of the Act. This need for evidence is an argument for new findings
as a necessary step in extending the life of the Act. However, if the need for the
Act has not yet dissipated, Congress should not find that hurdle difficult to
overcome.
Finally, we find the role played by the DOJ both important and necessary and
would love to see it codified in the statute. We concede that such a result is
unlikely but one that would help ensure that no Attorney General will single-
handedly set back the statute's important goals. Of course, Congress may also
choose to disagree with these goals as understood by the DOJ, but our hope is that
Congress will both agree with these goals and the DOJ's interpretations. If so, the
logical step is simply to codify these interpretations into the statute.
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